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COVER STORY (MoneyLIFE Issue, 29th Jan 09) January 13, 2009

After The Satyam Scam 7 Ways to Clean Up the Market In an excellent article in The New York Times, Michael Lewis, who wrote Liar’s Poker, and David Einhorn, who wrote Fooling Some of the People All of the Time,
have analysed why America and its regulators failed to check the
rampant greed and wrongdoing that ended in massive financial collapse
and triggered a global recession. Lewis and Einhorn paint a worrying
picture of the powerful Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
how difficult it was to get its officials to recognise wrongdoing. In
the throes of what is the biggest financial crisis, the collapse of
Bernard L Madoff’s $50 billion Ponzi scheme still had the power to
shock the world. Here is something worse. Lewis and Einhorn say that
one Harry Markopolos spent nine fruitless years trying to get the SEC
to see that Madoff “couldn’t be anything other than a fraud” because
his “investment performance, given his stated strategy, was not merely
improbable but mathematically impossible.” At one stage, SEC even gave
him a clean chit. But even in 2005, Markopolos wrote a 17-page letter
to the SEC pointing to the likelihood that “Madoff Securities is the
world’s largest Ponzi Scheme.” It was. The events
at Wall Street hold several lessons for India’s regulators and, unlike
the US, we don’t need to wait for a new president to usher in the
much-needed change. We also need to chart our own course by framing
policies suited to the Indian market and its investors. Assuming that
the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and various
policymakers are interested in a set of comprehensive reforms, what can
be done? Here are seven key issues to tackle. Investors need to track
the progress of these issues to see if the regulators are actually
working for them to make the Indian markets safer and fairer. Unfortunately,
the task will not be easy, since Indian regulators, especially SEBI,
have already internalised what is at the core of the US failure –
intolerance for divergent views and general lethargy about acting on
feedback from investors, intermediaries or those affected by
malfeasance and manipulation. In India too, there are plenty of
examples where investors are tired of sending letters to SEBI only to
have them dismissed as expressions of vested interests. 1. Political Meddling While
India has not been as badly affected by the global financial crisis,
the comparisons between the US situation and India are pretty chilling.
For instance, the authors say, “The SEC has somehow evolved into a
mechanism for protecting financial predators with political clout from
investors.” Isn’t it the same here? How else do you explain the Zee
group getting away with a mere warning after the Ketan Parekh scandal,
when it had already offered to pay as much as Rs5 crore by filing
consent terms? Nobody wants to revisit the case. According
to the writers, the SEC was under constant political pressure to avoid
any action that could “roil the financial markets.” Ditto in India.
From 1992 to 2000 and beyond, no corporate house has been punished,
despite their deep involvement in financial scandals. It is only
brokers and bank officials who end up as scapegoats. In the past four
years, former finance minister P Chidambaram’s obsessive interest in
the capital market ensured protection to non-transparent investment in
the form of participatory notes (PNs). SEBI’s policy flip-flop and
reversal of the post-crisis curbs on issue of fresh PNs attracted wide
criticism because it kept the door open for the inflow of
non-transparent money. (PNs are derivative instruments representing
underlying Indian securities purchased by those who are “otherwise not
eligible to invest in the Indian market.”) In the
US, the SEC only targeted and questioned short-sellers, although they
were the ones with the sensible contrarian view. In India, SEBI was
quick to give short-sellers a clean chit even after well-respected
bankers and institutional heads had complained about their share prices
being hammered by short-sellers. Why? Because the only short-selling
done in India was by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) through
PNs. The regulator alone has access to all FII data and we have been
told that the quantum of short-selling was too insignificant to impact
the market. Those who had complained to SEBI have maintained a discreet
silence in public. Meanwhile, SEBI cannot seem to
come up with a workable stock lending and borrowing scheme (SLBS) that
will allow domestic investors to short-sell and is making no move to
bar FIIs from short-selling through the PN route (it has only conveyed
a verbal disapproval of this practice). Only two trades were registered
under the revised SLBS launched on 22nd December. So we have an amazing
situation where foreigners alone can short-sell Indian stocks in the
Indian market. Indian investors can, of course,
short-sell through the futures & options (F&O) route. But, even
a decade after we launched F&O trading, there is no move to switch
to a delivery-based market. The method of selecting scrips for
inclusion in the F&O segment has attracted criticism even from the
broker community. The automatic inclusion of large-cap stocks in the
derivatives segment immediately on listing also used to trigger rampant
speculation and price manipulation. But former SEBI chairman, M
Damodaran, did not bother to initiate quick action, despite repeated
representations by investor associations. It is only in the past few
weeks that the National Stock Exchange (NSE), which has a virtual
monopoly in this segment, is dropping some of the more dubious
companies from the derivatives list. Is the Exchange driven only by a
compulsion to increase the turnover? The NSE’s growing monopoly
(especially after cross margining) is not a healthy development for the
Indian capital market. But the government is making no attempt to put
the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) back on its feet or to permit strong
new players in the capital market segment. Capital
market-related pressure from the political powers was not restricted to
SEBI. Former RBI governor, Dr Y Venugopal Reddy, was under tremendous
pressure and attracted orchestrated criticism for his conservative
approach to esoteric new products. A central banker tells us, “If
Indian banks had any honesty, they will get together to thank YV Reddy
for saving them by ignoring their slick presentations seeking
permission to launch toxic derivatives in India and for standing up to
pressure from the finance minister.” Ironically, the banks remain
silent; P Chidambaram is taking credit for the relative safety of our
financial system; and Dr Reddy has chosen not to speak or make any
public appearances for a year after stepping down as governor. 2. SEBI to Dalal Street What
stopped the US SEC from cracking down? It is the prospect of earning
fat bonuses that drove Wall Street executives to ignore flashing danger
signals as they issued, amassed and hard-sold toxic debt or fancy homes
and credit cards to those who could not afford them. It was a
combination of political pressure and self-interest that prevented the
SEC from acting against corporate malfeasance, say Lewis and Einhorn.
SEC officials, they say, are guided by their self-interest in
maintaining good relations with Wall Street. A large number of SEC
officials switch to well-paid private-sector jobs. It is exactly the
same in India. The best way to land a terrific job in the financial
sector is probably through SEBI. A majority of those who leave SEBI get
private sector jobs with market intermediaries; in fact, deputation
with SEBI is the most attractive option for bureaucrats as well as
revenue and enforcement officers in government precisely for this
reason. 3. Deaf to Investor Complaints The
speed of resolution of investor grievances is a never- ending
work-in-progress. One positive move has been the introduction of
‘applications supported by blocked amount’ (ASBA) scheme which keeps
retail investors’ money in their bank accounts until allotment. This
will discourage the orchestrated hype to garner heavy oversubscription
and collect large float funds. However, the efficacy of ASBA will only
be tested when the primary market revives. The
market collapse since early 2008 has triggered a flood of investor
complaints and exposed how they exploit broker-client agreements and
depository accounts. SEBI has finally acknowledged the misuse of
designated depository accounts and has ordered the inspection of
several brokers’ books. Several years after we flagged the issue, the
regulator now plans to examine the broker-client agreement and initiate
steps to safeguard investors’ rights. But SEBI has still to recognise
the hardship faced by investors in resolving disputes with brokers.
Stock exchanges, the first line of regulation, are party to harassing
investors by pushing them into arbitration proceedings even when the
disputed amounts are small. When CB Bhave took over as chairman, he
agreed with this writer that stock exchanges must make an attempt to
resolve disputes before shoving investors into arbitration; nothing has
happened so far. 4. Attention Deficit Disorder Another
problem that afflicts the SEC also exists at SEBI – a lack of
understanding of the complex derivative instruments that it is supposed
to regulate. The top officials at SEBI, who pass orders on a host of
complex issues, have to be geniuses if they are instantly able to grasp
the nuances of capital markets embodied in the regulation. Naturally,
they depend on junior officials to make recommendations. The extent of
their knowledge is also questionable, since SEBI officials are not open
to market intelligence and public inputs in the investigation process.
Also, the organisation is structured in a way that information is not
adequately shared between the primary and secondary market departments
and those handling investor complaints, with the investigation and
enforcement divisions. 5. It’s Consensual A
few years ago, when SEBI was being battered by the Securities Appellate
Tribunal (SAT) overturning its most significant orders, it decided to
adopt the consent process made popular by the SEC to settle market
disputes. Under the process, which was formally introduced in April
2007, those accused of violating the rules could agree to file consent
terms and get away by paying a fine but without admitting or denying
any wrongdoing. Over the past eight months, the consent process has
been operating in high gear. The regulator has collected over Rs40
crore through the rapid disposal of over 400 cases. In fact, the
much-hyped multiple-application scam, which was a claimed highlight of
M Damodaran’s tenure as SEBI chief, has been disposed off through the
consent route. Is this a healthy trend? Or has
the consent mechanism turned into a pay-and-get-away scheme because of
the utter lack of transparency and clarity on how it functions and who
decides the gravity of, and payment for, a particular offence? Here
too, there is a high-level committee that recommends action to SEBI and
orders are passed by a bench of two directors. But it turns out that
the process of taking issues up to the committee has dwindled into a
murky, non-transparent mechanism handled by a committee of junior SEBI
officials who have turned incredibly powerful. After complaints about
the arbitrariness of the consent process, some corrective action was
initiated in December 2008 which will be implemented in the coming days. The
willingness to initiate corrective action is an important development,
but will work better if the regulator keeps an open mind. It will then
be in a position to anticipate problems instead of reacting to them.
Recently, SEBI barred early exits from close-ended mutual fund schemes
such as fixed maturity plans (FMPs). Had this action been initiated as
soon as panic withdrawals began to hurt the funds, it would have saved
investors the money they lost on hefty exit loads on premature
withdrawals. SEBI has now barred premature withdrawal from close-ended
mutual funds and made listing on the bourses mandatory. This is a
welcome move. But SEBI must also stop the exploitation of retail
investors by ensuring that mutual funds either charge an identical load
to retail and large corporate investors, or have separate schemes for
the two. SEBI’s other directive – mutual funds cannot have an
asset-liability mismatch in investments – will also have to be checked
through regular inspections. 6. Rating the Raters Lewis
and Einhorn say that the problem central to the creation of toxic debt
was simply this: “that the raters are paid by the issuers.” Well, guess
what? Several of us have spent years making this argument to SEBI in
the context of IPO ratings. The SEBI board, in its wisdom, ignored the
recommendation. It is now reworking the regulation of rating agencies
to align it with the needs of different regulators in multiple markets.
We will soon know whether this exercise addresses the issue of who will
pay the rating agencies. 7. Stock Exchange Issues The
past year has seen several interesting developments on the stock
exchange front. SEBI became the designated regulator for currency
exchanges leading to the launch of three new bourses. This has led to a
nasty war for supremacy, especially since the NSE has been challenged
for the first time. So far, the regulator has chosen to be a spectator
rather than a referee. Meanwhile, the BSE is languishing in the
currency bourse too, calling attention to how the government may have
ended up destroying India’s oldest exchange. Instead of a
professionally managed and demutualised bourse, what the government has
achieved is a rudderless organisation with mediocre management,
installed by a process mandated by SEBI and the finance ministry. SEBI
has also cleared rules for an SME (small and medium enterprises) bourse
which has led to howls of protest from the market because they seem so
clearly structured as to ensure that only the NSE qualifies to enter
this segment. The third development is an exit route for over 20
regional stock exchanges that have been languishing without business
for nearly 15 years. This exit scheme seems genuinely workable if
government revenue agencies do not raise new demands. Another positive
move was to raise the cap on shareholding in stock exchanges from 5% to
15% for certain categories. One gaping hole in
the regulatory structure remains untouched. It is the lack of clarity
about SEBI’s regulatory writ over depositories (National Securities
Depository Ltd and Central Depository Services (India) Limited) and
custodians such as the Stock Holding Corporation of India Limited
(SHCIL). All three entities have diversified into businesses over which
SEBI has no regulatory jurisdiction. SHCIL, in particular, has been
embroiled in a serious scandal that is being investigated by the
Central Bureau of Investigation and the Serious Fraud Investigation
Office. SEBI has to clarify its regulatory mandate over these entities
or ring-fence their capital market-related activities and ensure that
investors’ money is protected and not used to subsidise other growth
plans. SEBI is conducting two investor surveys to
understand why investors stay away from the stock exchanges – one
through the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy and the other through
the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER). Ironically,
the last time the regulator conducted such a survey, it was immediately
after the primary market crash in 1996. At that time, the NCAER survey
had simply blanked out the entire IPO mania that killed the primary
market for 10 long years. It is only to be hoped
that this time the surveys actually get the right investors and
highlight all the issues, the red tape, the cumbersome processes and
the lack of security about the safety of their savings that keeps the
majority of middle-class investors away from the capital market.
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